The Double Role of Ethnic Heterogeneity in Explaining Welfare-State Generosity by Jäntti, Markus et al.
Yale University 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers Cowles Foundation 
12-1-2014 
The Double Role of Ethnic Heterogeneity in Explaining Welfare-
State Generosity 
Markus Jäntti 
Gerald David Jaynes 
John E. Roemer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jäntti, Markus; Jaynes, Gerald David; and Roemer, John E., "The Double Role of Ethnic Heterogeneity in 
Explaining Welfare-State Generosity" (2014). Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers. 2386. 
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cowles-discussion-paper-series/2386 
This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Cowles Foundation at EliScholar – A 
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Papers by an authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at 
Yale. For more information, please contact elischolar@yale.edu. 
THE DOUBLE ROLE OF ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY
IN EXPLAINING WELFARE-STATE GENEROSITY
By
Markus Jäntti, Gerald Jaynes, and John E. Roemer
December 2014
COWLES FOUNDATION DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 1972
COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 208281








Markus Jantti, Gerald Jaynes, and John E. Roemer* 
Abstract
 Based on theoretical models of budget-balanced social insurance and individual 
choice, we argue that in addition to the well-known empathy mechanism whereby ethnic 
heterogeneity undermines sentiments of solidarity among a citizenry to reduce welfare 
generosity, population heterogeneity affects the generosity of a polity's social insurance 
programs through another distinct mechanism, political conflict.  Ethnic heterogeneity likely 
intensifies political conflict and reduces welfare generosity because heterogeneity of 
unemployment risk makes it more difficult to achieve social consensus concerning tax-
benefit programs. Utilizing two separate regression analyses covering highly diverse polities, 
the 50 U.S. states and District of Columbia (CPS data), and 13 OECD countries (LIS data), 
we find strong evidence that empirically distinct empathy and political conflict effects on 
unemployment insurance programs characterize contemporary politics.  Our findings suggest 
existing analyses of the negative relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and the size of the 
welfare state likely over- or underestimate the empathy effect.  For example, perhaps 
surprisingly, had our analysis of US data omitted a measure of unemployment dispersion, the 
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It is often held that the cause of the large welfare states in the Nordic countries is their 
homogeneous populations.   The modern version of this view has been advanced by Alesina, Glaeser, 
and Sacerdote (2001) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004).  The mechanism through which homogeneity 
is thought to work is through promoting solidaristic feelings among the population.   If a society is 
culturally and ethnically homogeneous, then its members can empathize with each other, and so the 
genesis of generous welfare states is attributed to a kind of altruism that does not exist between 
groups who share little in culture, religion, or language.    
There is, however, another mechanism through which homogeneity may induce generous 
welfare states, and this mechanism does not invoke empathy or altruism.  If a society is culturally 
homogeneous, its members are likely to face similar risks – more similar, at any rate, than members 
of heterogeneous societies, if that heterogeneity is correlated with educational and life-style 
distributions.  If all members of a society face the same risks – the same probability distribution of 
bad states occurring – then, assuming each member is risk averse, all will possess the same ideal 
budget-balanced insurance policy.   This is so even if individuals possess different von Neumann – 
Morgenstern utility functions over income lotteries, as long as each is risk averse.  It follows that it 
should be much easier to come to political agreement on what the optimal insurance policy is when 
the society is homogeneous, and this may produce larger welfare states.  We repeat this mechanism 
does not rely on the empathy that homogeneity may induce, but rather on the consequences of 
homogeneity for the choice of ideal self-interested insurance policies. 
Consider the following simple model to illustrate this point.   Each member of a society faces 
the same probability of unemployment.    A worker i is characterized by her wage wi  if employed, 




strictly concave.  The distribution of wages is F with mean .    Every worker faces the same 
probability p of being unable to earn income, in which case she collects a benefit that is a fraction of 
her wage, .  Employed workers are taxed at a rate t on income.   A policy  is budget-
balanced if: 
or .  (1.1) 
Thus, worker i’s ideal budget-balanced policy is given by: 
      (1.2) 
s.t.  
Letting , this is equivalent to solving: 
    maxui ((1 r)wi )+ rui ( wi )       
whose first-order condition reduces to Strict concavity of the utility 
function implies (1 r)wi = wi  , and hence .  Thus every worker, 
regardless of her (risk averse) preferences or wage, possesses the same ideal policy, which is 
complete income-smoothing; she enjoys an income of (1 p)wi  whether working or unemployed.  If, 
however, workers face different risks, they will possess different ideal policies.   No simple budget-
balanced policy will satisfy everyone.   It will be more difficult to reach a political agreement on 
social insurance. 
 Our conjecture is that there are two mechanisms operating in the genesis of social 
insurance, in both of which population homogeneity is important.   The first we call the empathy 




a polity, the more differentiated are the risks that its members face, causing political conflict over the 
level of social insurance, and hence less expansive social insurance. 
We must justify the last clause in this claim.   Why should the fact that polities face highly 
differentiated risks induce less expansive social insurance than otherwise?  We suggest several 
reasons.   The first is that the population type that suffers the smallest risks, which will tend to 
comprise its higher paid and more educated members, may have influence in the political process in 
excess of its numbers.  Clearly, this would not happen with the median-voter model of politics, if the 
lower paid and less educated worker is the median worker.  We are therefore assuming a political 
mechanism more like the one that Bartels (2008) and Gilens (2009) indicate exists in the United 
States, where richer voters have far more influence on policy than poorer ones.    
A second reason may be that the actual political mechanism entails bargaining, rather than 
median-voter hegemony.  Different population types are represented in political bargaining, and they 
reach a compromise.  If the bargaining process is inefficient, then the social-insurance policy may be 
less comprehensive than any of the types would like.   However, even if bargaining is efficient, then 
it will still represent a compromise between the low-tax-benefit policy that the type with the low 
probability of bad states would like and the high-tax-benefit policy that the type with high 
probability of bad states would like.   
Consider the following simple Nash bargaining model.   There are two worker types in the 
population, A and B, where type A constitutes fraction f of the population.  A types have an average 
annual wage of wA  if employed, and face an unemployment probability pA of being unemployed 
during the year in question.  Type B workers earn an annual wage of wB  and face a probability pB  




on money lotteries.    Given these facts, the set of feasible tax-benefit policies (t, )  of the type 
described earlier must satisfy the budget constraint: 
t(K 1) ,   (1.3) 
where .  
The ideal policy for type B maximizes pJu( wJ )+ (1 pJ )u((1 t)wJ )   subject to (1.3).    
Let u(0) = 0  .   The Nash bargaining problem between these two groups of workers is to choose the 
policy ( ,t)  that maximizes the Nash product 
  
(pAu( wA )+ (1 pA )u((1 t)wA ) (1 pA )u(wA ))
(pBu( wB )+ (1 pB )u((1 t)wB ) (1 pB )u(wB ))
 
subject to (1.3).  The impasse point in the bargaining problem is the expected utility of a worker, 
were there no insurance.  Consider an example parameterized by the data 
( f ,wA ,wB , pA , pB ) = (0.4,20,60, pA , pB )  , let u(x) = ln x , and suppose that an unemployed worker in 
the absence of insurance receives an income of one from some source, so that her utility is zero in 
this case.    In the homogeneous situation, when pA = pB = 0.1 , the ideal policy for both types is 
t = 0.1,   = 0.9 , and it is, of course, the solution to the Nash bargaining problem.  Now suppose 
there is a mean-preserving spread of the probabilities of unemployment, so that 
pA = 0.2, pB = 0.033 .   Then the solution to the bargaining problem is t = 0.054, = 0.867 : the 
social insurance is less generous than in the original homogeneous situation1.   The tax rate is higher 
than type B would like, and lower than type A would like.  
                                                
1A mean-preserving spread of the probabilities does not always decrease the tax rate that solves the Nash 
bargaining problem, but this appears to be so for changes in the probabilities that are not too small.   The 




Yet a third reason for the relatively small welfare states in heterogeneous societies is based 
upon the multi-dimensionality of politics.  In heterogeneous societies, political competition over 
economic issues, here taken to be social insurance, is complicated by a second non-economic issue 
that often has to do with race, ethnicity, or religion.   Roemer (1998) and Roemer, Lee and Van der 
Straeten (2007) show that when this second issue exists, the political equilibrium is likely to deliver 
a smaller welfare state than it would in the absence of the second issue.  The last reference cited 
estimates that the income tax rate in the U.S. is as much as ten percentage points lower than it would 
be, were race not an important issue for the American polity.  This reduction in the tax rate can be 
decomposed into an ‘anti-solidarity effect’ and a ‘policy bundle effect.’   The former is simply the 
absence of empathy and inter-ethnic altruism in an ethnically heterogeneous society; the latter has to 
do with the bundling together of policies.  These authors estimate that about half of the reduction in 
tax rates referred to in the U.S. is due to the policy bundle effect.  Intuitively, think of this as being 
manifest in the relatively large vote that the Republican Party receives from whites, because they 
prefer that party’s policy on race to the Democrats’ policy, even though the Republicans advocate a 
low-redistribution policy that is not in the economic interests of many of these white voters.  Thus, 
the existence of the race issue in U.S. politics enables the Republican Party to achieve an 
approximately 50% vote share, while not moving their economic policy to the left, as competition 
would force them to do, were the race issue were not so salient for voters. 
Our reasoning suggests that we attempt to explain the differential size of welfare states not 
simply with an independent variable measuring ethnic heterogeneity, as Alesina and Glaeser do, but 
with a second independent variable as well, one that measures the degree of heterogeneity of income 
risks that a population faces.  With these two variables in a regression, where the dependent variable 




political-conflict effect and the ethnic heterogeneity variable should pick up the empathy effect.   We 
expect the coefficients on both variables to be negative. 
The next section of the article generalizes our earlier simple model where workers were 
either employed or unemployed to a model allowing workers to experience spells of unemployment 
of varying length.  We then illustrate that theoretical results from the latter model’s more realistic 
portrayal of individual worker’s unemployment risk remain consistent with our ideas and major 
hypotheses concerning the provision of social unemployment insurance.  Afterwards, we subject the 
testable predictions of the theoretical models to two econometric analyses using data from the United 
States and several OECD nations, respectively.  To explain varying generosity of jurisdictions' 
unemployment insurance benefits, we model the empathy and political conflict mechanisms using 
racial heterogeneity across the states (immigrant proportion of population in OECD nations), and the 
coefficient of variation of weeks unemployed across jurisdictions.
   The econometric tests provide strong support for our theoretical predictions.   We estimate 
robust statistically significant negative effects of ethnic/racial heterogeneity and risk heterogeneity 
on unemployment benefits across the states in the U.S. and across OECD nations.  The main body of 
the paper concludes with a brief summary of our results.  An appendix provides robustness tests for 
the U.S. regressions. 
2.  Risky length of unemployment spells 
The measure of risk heterogeneity we use in the empirical analyses is the coefficient of variation 
of weeks unemployed experienced by a population.  Therefore, in this section, we generalize the 




unemployed for the year to cover the desired degree of insurance as a function of the probability 
distribution of individual-unemployment-spell lengths. 
Therefore, as before, let and  be the full-employment wages for a worker in the respective 
groups, and let f i be the group population proportions so f AwA + f BwB = is mean income at full 
employment.  We suppose there is a discrete grid of unemployment-spell lengths, , that varies 
from  (full employment for the individual) to  (unemployed for the whole year).  
Generally, y is a fraction of the year.  Let   be the probability that a worker of wage w will 
sustain an unemployment spell y during the year.  By definition,  for every w. 
  Let  be the average annual market income per capita of employed workers and let 0  be the 
average per capita income loss suffered by unemployed workers.   By definition, = 1 + 0 .   Note 
that  is the fractional loss of GNP due to unemployment.   
A simple policy is an ordered pair ( ,t)   such that an unemployed worker of wage w receives the 
benefit wy  for a period y of unemployment, and a worker who is employed for fraction 1 y of the 
year pays a tax of tw(1 y)  .  It follows that the balanced-budget equation for the society 
characterized by the probability distributions {qy(w)} is: 
    t 1 = 0  .      (2.1) 
Explicitly we may write for i= A, B: 
    (2.2a) 
     (2.2b) 





Let u be the concave von Neumann- Morgenstern utility function of an individual in the 
population over money lotteries.  The ideal policy for an individual of capacity w is the solution 
to: 






(w) u( wy + (1 t)w(1 y)( )
subj. to
t 1 = 0
 .   (2.3) 
Here, w is fixed, and the probability distribution is over unemployment-spell lengths, y. 
Substituting   into the objective function, we compute that the ideal ‘replacement ratio’  
for the individual w – assuming that this ratio is interior in the interval , is given by the 
first-order condition: 
  qy(w)u (I(w, y))(wy 0
1
w(1 y))) = 0,
y1=0
yJ =1
    (2.4) 
where I(w, y) wy + (1 t)w(1 y)  is the individual’s annual income if he is unemployed for y 
fraction of the year.   
 To derive a relatively simple formula, we will at this point assume that  
   u(x) = ln(x)  .       (2.5) 
Then (2.4) can be written: 
  . 
Letting  denote the ideal replacement rate for agent w, this in turn can be written as: 




where .The ideal replacement rate for agent w, 
assuming it is interior, is the value of w  satisfying equation (2.6). 
  Compute that (y) < 0 , so the function ( )  is decreasing in the regions in which it is 
defined.   Note that  approaches an asymptote as , at which point it is undefined.   Note 
that  and (1) = 0 .  It follows from these observations that  has the shape illustrated 
in figure 1.  Since the upper limit of  is  , achieved when t = 1  , it follows that (0)+ w < 0  .   
Hence, from figure 1, it immediately follows that (y)+ w < 0   for  and obviously 
(y)+ w > 0 for  .    
  [figure 1 here] 
 We can therefore decompose (2.6) as: 
    (2.7) 
where all the terms in the first sum are negative and all the terms in the second sum are positive. 
 As in our simpler model, in the homogeneous situation when  or 
unemployment risk profiles are identical, the ideal policy for both types is identical.  Now 
analogous to the mean-preserving spread of the earlier model where type A's risk of 
unemployment became unambiguously greater, suppose there is a change in type A's 
wage and risk profile, so that all the fractions  for   increase and all the 
fractions  for  decrease.  For any fixed value , all the terms in the first 




similarly greater for than for  .  It follows that it must be the case that in 
order for (2.7) to hold for both groups.   
 We have shown the following: 
Proposition:  Let u(w) = ln(w) for all w.  Suppose that A and B are two groups such that, for: 
  ,  and ,  
 Then  .   
  
 It is this proposition that supports our claim that the larger is the dispersion in 
unemployment spells in a population, the larger will be the dispersion in desired replacement ratios, 
and assuming that ethnic heterogeneity makes such dispersion more likely, political conflict over 
tax-benefit policy will intensify.  Of course, the exact claim made by the proposition is not that 
general, which is why it is necessary to make the calculation leading to the proposition. 
 
3.  Econometric Tests 
This section features econometric testing of our hypothesis that population heterogeneity 
affects welfare state generosity through distinct empathy and political-conflict mechanisms.  
Controlling for other individual as well as jurisdictional characteristics, we regress measures of 
individuals' annual unemployment benefits on measures of the population heterogeneity and 
dispersion of unemployment risk within the political jurisdiction of the individual’s place of 
residence.  According to the theory (other relevant variables constant), greater levels of ethnic 
heterogeneity within a polity should reduce received unemployment benefits because of decreased 




unemployment).  We report two separate analyses of the effects of heterogeneity on the delivery of 
unemployment benefits.  The first analysis examines heterogeneity and unemployment benefits 
using data from 51 (state and District of Columbia) political jurisdictions composing the United 
States. The second examines our hypotheses using data from 13 OECD countries available in the 
Luxembourg Income Study database (2014) (LIS), spanning the period 1984 to 2010.   We first 
describe the U.S. data and samples, and then proceed to describe the data drawn from LIS. 
3.1. U.S. data 
Its governance system of federalism in which state governments with diverse ethnic 
populations, socioeconomic characteristics, and political orientations deliver publicly provided 
goods and services within parameters defined by a common federal government, makes the United 
States a virtual laboratory for empirical tests of hypotheses similar to ours.  U.S. fiscal federalism’s 
delivery of unemployment benefits is especially suitable for such an analysis.  The U.S. Federal-
State Unemployment Insurance Program delivers unemployment benefits to eligible workers under 
the auspices of the federal government.  However, each of the local governments (the fifty states, 
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands) administers its own program 
subject to guidelines laid out in Federal law.
The program's main features are straightforward.  Constrained by parameters set by federal 
law, the state where eligibility for benefits is established determines eligibility requirements, weekly 
benefit amounts (WBA), and the duration of benefit payments.  To establish eligibility a claimant 
must apply, demonstrate a recent strong attachment to the labor force by satisfying state 
requirements for wages earned or time worked during a "base period," be determined unemployed 




the first four of the five calendar quarters immediately preceding filing of a claim; no-fault eligibility 
rules out workers fired for cause or who quit; readiness requirements render sick or injured workers 
ineligible for unemployment benefits, although they may seek disability benefits.2
Variations in the method by which the WBA is determined differentiate benefits paid across 
the states.  A large majority of states compute weekly benefits as a fraction (usually about one-half) 
of a claimant’s usual weekly wages in one or more quarters of her base period.  Typically, the WBA 
is a fraction of wages during the base period quarter with highest earnings; however, some states 
average two quarters.  Two additional important sources of variation in the WBA paid by states are 
state determined maximum and minimum amounts.  During 2006, among the fifty states and the 
District of Columbia, the maximum varied from a low of $235 per week in Mississippi to a high of 
$979 in Massachusetts, one of a minority of states supplementing a claimant's basic benefit with an 
allowance for dependents.  The minimum WBA varies from a low of $5 in Hawaii to a high of $143 
in Washington State.  A final source of variation across jurisdictions is a state’s limit on the duration 
of benefit payments.  Although the limits varied from 20 weeks in South Carolina and Missouri to 30 
weeks in Massachusetts, the vast majority of states allowed a maximum duration of 26 weeks.3
Our data set for the U.S. is the March 2007 CPS, which provides relevant data for the year 
2006.  Our model regresses the natural logarithm of annual benefits received (conditional on 
                                                
2Taxes on employers primarily fund the benefits in all but three states who also tax employees.
Therefore, think of the benefit tax t as worker’s common belief concerning the portion of the 
employer tax shifted to workers.
3In the 1970s, a permanent federal-state program of Extended Benefits was established for workers 
who exhaust their entitlement to regular state benefits during periods of high unemployment. The 




receiving benefits) on ethnic fractionalization, the coefficient of variation of "covered" weeks 
unemployed, and a set of control variables described below.  In addition to conditioning on the 
receipt of benefits, we apply data filters designed to replicate state program requirements to 
eliminate records that are inconsistent with eligibility requirements during the relevant year (e.g., 
individuals reporting positive benefits but zero weeks of unemployment, or are inconsistent with 
program benefit limitations such as maximums and minimums).  The latter filters have the desired 
effect of eliminating obvious data reporting errors (e.g. six figure benefits, $1 of annual benefits) as 
well as reported benefits exceeding or falling below state specifications.
The filters replicate two policy instruments: 1. state limitations on the duration of benefit 
payments (covered weeks of unemployment); 2. state imposed maxima and minima weekly benefits. 
A priori, we expect the recipient’s weekly wage and her weeks unemployed to be the most 
powerful predictor of annual benefits.  However, because many recipients reported more weeks of 
unemployment than the number for which a state would allow payment of benefits, using 
individuals' reported number of weeks unemployed would violate this important eligibility 
requirement, resulting in a serious miss-specification.  We re-specify the relationship between annual 
benefits and weeks unemployed, by computing a new variable "covered weeks of unemployment" 
(covWksUn) equal to the minimum of each individual's reported weeks of unemployment and her 
state-of-residence's maximum duration of payment weeks.
Implementing policy instrument 2 could entail a straightforward requirement that no 
recipient’s WBA lie outside the appropriate state’s maximum and minimum WBA.  Although we 
report the results from using this control during our discussion of regression robustnessin the 
appendix, our primary model utilizes a different approach to placing bounds on a recipient’s WBA.  




although the great majority of recipient's state of residence (coded in the CPS) is also their state of 
benefit eligibility, this is not true for a substantial number of recipients.  In addition to relocations 
across state boundaries during a spell of unemployment, many recipients' permanent employment is 
in jurisdictions other than their state of permanent residence.  Thus, many large metropolitan centers 
(NYC, WDC, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Boston, Jacksonville, Memphis) provide employment to 
large populations residing in multi-state regions.4
Secondly, the amount of a state’s minimum WBA is not as obvious a signal of state 
generosity as might appear.  For example, the smallest minimum WBA, Hawaii’s $5, appears not to 
be a reflection of a lack of welfare generosity, but a liberal state’s attempt to provide a benefit to 
even the minimal amount of work effort during a claimant’s base period.  Since Hawaii calculates a 
claimant’s weekly benefit amount by dividing her high base quarter earnings by 21, a $5 WBA 
implies 13 weeks of earnings totaling just $105, approximately one hour of minimum wage earnings 
during a 13 week period.   Payment of benefits this low would be extremely rare.  For example, an 
eligible claimant working half-time (20 hours a week) at the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per 
hour would qualify for about a $90 WBA in Hawaii.  For comparison, a minimum wage worker 
working one-half time in Mississippi would receive a WBA of $72.50, equivalent to 50 percent of 
her 13 week earnings. 
                                                
4 Prospective claimants are advised "Generally, you should file your claim with the state where you 
worked. If you worked in a state other than the one where you now live or if you worked in multiple 
states, the state UI agency where you now live can provide information about how to file your claim 




Our approach to these issues is to place state and individual specific lower and upper bounds 
on benefits received as follows.  For the lower bound, we remove all records with annual benefits 
less than covered weeks of unemployment times the maximum of the state's minimum WBA or 
$72.50.  For the upper bound, we remove all records with annual benefits above $716 times the 
state’s maximum covered weeks of eligibility.  The amount $716 is the maximum WBA allowed by 
the state of Maine, second to the $979 (including up to $326 for the beneficiary’s dependents) 
allowed in Massachusetts.  Because of Census Bureau limitations on the maximum weekly earnings 
reported (top coding), we considered any record with wage earnings above $2885 per week as an 
error and discarded it. Finally, we also eliminate individuals with weekly wages below $145 (20 
hours at federal minimum wage) and those below age 18 or above age 65.  Applying these filters to 
the data produced a data set quite comparable to the covered labor force reported by the Department 
of Labor (DOL) for the year 2006 (see Table 1). 
Table 1
Comparison of Filtered Sample data with DOL reported “Covered Labor Force” 
3.2. LIS data 
We use data from the Luxembourg Income Study database (LIS, 2014) to examine the 
relationship between benefits, unemployment risk and ethnic heterogeneity across countries. There 
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spell of unemployment and the number of weeks of unemployment during the income reference 
period, which in the vast majority of cases is the calendar year. We use this latter variable to measure 
unemployment risk. We are able to use data for 13 countries over multiple periods, with altogether 
52 country-year pairs.5 For all those observations where we can measure the number of weeks of 
unemployment, we also have access to a variable that indicates immigrant status, and we use 
immigrants' share of the country's population as our measure of ethnic or population heterogeneity. 
Finally, to measure unemployment benefits, we add means-tested, universal, and earnings-related 
unemployment benefits into a single variable, measured in terms of 2010 PPP-adjusted US dollars.
We are not able to reconstruct the covered labor force for each country-year pair as in the 
U.S. data. Our point of departure is the non-elderly adult (i.e., working-age) population. We measure 
unemployment risk by the coefficient of variation of weeks of unemployment among those who 
were unemployed for at least one week during the income reference period. We measure 
unemployment risk both including and excluding immigrants. We estimate the share of immigrants 
for the working-age population. Wages and unemployment benefits (for those with positive benefits) 
are estimated for those who are working-age and in the labor force.
Within each country-year pair in LIS, we divide the relevant samples into cells defined by 
age (4 groups, 10-year intervals), education (low, medium, high and “indistinguishable”; this last 
category often applies to immigrants), and gender, so there are 32 cells within each country-year. 
The regressions are estimated using cell-level estimates of the variables and weighted using cell size. 
All regressions include country-year fixed effects that control for overall level of GDP and other 
attributes shared within a country in a given year.
                                                
5 The countries we include are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, 





4.  Regression results 
4.1. U.S. regressions 
In addition to main effects, we test if statewide variables such as ethnic fractionalization and 
unemployment dispersion interact to affect annual benefits, or if either moderates the increase in 
benefits due to an extra week of covered unemployment via interaction effects with the latter 
explanatory variable.  We estimate the system: 
.
Here equals individual i’s annual benefits,  is a vector of i’s individual characteristics (including 
 covered weeks of unemployment);  is a vector of state characteristics in individual i’s state 
of residence,  is a vector of interaction variables, and  are vector-valued coefficients 
to be estimated.  Primes in equation 2 indicate vectors including a subset of the components in the 
corresponding unprimed vector of equation 1.  The primary individual predictor variables of interest 
include covered weeks of unemployment and the weekly wage; the primary state predictors include, 
the state’s mean weekly wage, unemployment dispersion (the coefficient of variation of weeks 
unemployed (cv), ethnic fractionalization of the state’s population), and policy mood, a measure of 
political liberalism in the state.6  In addition to the interaction of fractionalization and unemployment 
                                                
6 Ethnic fractionalization within a state is computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of group 
population shares.  The groups are African American, Asian American, Hispanic American, Native 
American, white non-Hispanic.  Policy Mood is a measure of public support for government 
programs on the liberal-conservative continuum.  The present authors obtained the policy mood data 




dispersion, we tested other interaction variables multiplying various explanatory variables such as 
fractionalization or unemployment dispersion by individual covered weeks of unemployment. 
The rationale for testing interaction effects in equation 1 is to examine if any possible effects 
of ethnic fractionalization or dispersion of unemployment risk are affected by the level of the other 
variable.  That is, is the presumed negative effect of ethnic fractionalization larger in a state with 
greater dispersion of unemployment durations?  One plausible interpretation of such a result would 
be that ethnic fractionalization accentuates the political conflict mechanism.  Similarly, we also 
examine if dispersion of weeks unemployed and ethnic fractionalization have moderating effects on 
benefit gains from an incremental week of covered unemployment. 
Theory predicts explanatory variables ‘covered weeks of unemployment’ and an 
‘individual’s weekly wage’ should have strong positive effects, as should the control variables policy 
mood and state average wage.  Alternatively, our hypothesis says increases in either ethnic 
fractionalization or dispersion of unemployment should decrease annual benefits through main 
effects, interactions, or both.  Other theoretical considerations based on incentive effects suggest 
covered weeks unemployed are determined simultaneously with benefits.  Therefore, we estimate it 
as an endogenous variable modeled in equation 2 as depending on the individual’s benefits, weekly 
wage, total weeks unemployed ( ), and a vector of aggregate state variables including ethnic 
fractionalization and dispersion of weeks unemployed.  Our final estimates of the explanatory 
variables in equation 1 uses 2sls with individual’s total weeks of unemployment as an instrument for 
covered weeks of unemployment.7
                                                
7 We used Hausman's (1978) test for endogeneity and determined that although the coefficient of 





To perform satisfactorily as an IV, total weeks unemployed, must be correlated with covered 
weeks unemployed (correlation .97); satisfy the exclusion restriction (it does not appear in equation 
1); and not be correlated with equation 1’s error term after controlling for the explanatory variables 
appearing in equation 1.  To see why we argue total-weeks- unemployed is exogenous in equation 1, 
observe that according to all state rules, given that equation 1 is conditional on receiving benefits, 
the only variables determining annual unemployment benefits subject to a claimant's decisions are 
the weekly wage and covered unemployment.  Any other variable both correlated with benefits and 
individual total weeks unemployed (e.g. education, experience, etc) could not affect the former 
directly, but only through weekly wages or covered weeks unemployed both of which are controlled 
for in equation 1, and would not be in the error term.  In particular, any unemployment beyond the 
individual’s covered unemployment could have no effect on benefits paid.
Results for the OLS and 2sls regressions appear in the first and second models of Table 2.  
There were no significant interaction effects, suggesting the effects of dispersion of unemployment 
risk on benefits paid do not depend on the level of ethnic fractionalization.  The two sets of 
regression results are quite similar with the explanatory variables explaining about three-fifths of the 
variation in annual benefits received by recipients.  As expected, the individual variables covered 
weeks unemployed and weekly wage both have statistically significant coefficients with positive 
signs indicating estimated elasticities of 0.82 and 0.22 respectively.
Let us put these estimates into perspective.  A recipient with mean average wage and covered 
weeks of unemployment paid benefits by a state with approximate mean levels of policy mood, 
ethnic fractionalization, and dispersion of unemployment risk (e.g. Ct, Ohio, Pennsylvania, 
Washington State), would receive an increment to annual benefits of approximately $218 from an 




this increase in benefits, with covered unemployment constant, the weekly wage would have to 
increase 25% ($8.72 per one percent increase in the weekly wage).
The regression results imply ethnic fractionalization, dispersion of weeks unemployed, and 
policy mood each have strong effects on a state's delivery of unemployment benefits.  For example, 
holding constant all other explanatory variables, a beneficiary receives about 12 percent lower 
annual benefits for each one-point increase (two s.d.) in the dispersion of weeks unemployed.  This 
suggests the average recipient in the previously mentioned states would receive from Michigan (with 
its nearly average state levels of policy mood and ethnic fractionalization but a cv of weeks 
unemployed about 1.33 s.d. below the mean) an increase in annual benefits of approximately $271 
(about one full week of benefits).  These are significant amounts, suggesting both the political 
conflict and empathy mechanisms are important contributors to the variation in unemployment 
benefits paid by states.
To underscore the importance to welfare generosity of both the empathy and political conflict 
mechanisms, we note that, as expected, fractionalization and unemployment dispersion were 
substantially associated across states, but unexpectedly, the association was negative (correlation -
.51).  Consequently, estimating the model with various specifications of the filters determining the 
covered labor force shows that omitting the unemployment dispersion variable results in a 
substantial underestimate of the effect of ethnic fractionalization on unemployment insurance 
generosity of U.S. states.8
                                                





Table 2: Regression Models and Results 












Coefficient 4.69** .219** .821** -.122** -.484** .008**    
s.e. .182 .021 .018 .032 .136 .002    
Mean    2.36 .30 42.56    
2SLS 4.66 .219 .832 -.121 -.488 .008    
 .182 .021 .018 .032 .136 .002 N=1421 .613 451.04 
Dependent variable is ln (unemployment income), all models.  **significant at 1% level.  IV is total 
weeks unemployed for covered weeks unemployed. 
4.2. LIS regressions 
As discussed in Section 4.1, our two main explanatory variables representing the 
hypothesized two source effects of heterogeneity on unemployment insurance generosity are the 
coefficient of variation of weeks unemployed and immigrants' share of the population.  Regression 
results for multiple countries based on LIS are estimated using age*education*gender cells. We 
include country-year fixed effects in the estimations, so the effect of both unemployment risk profile 
and ethnic fractionalization is identified off differential changes within countries across time 
affecting groups defined by age, gender, and education in unemployment risk, which in turn induces 
different benefit levels. This approach is similar to that first used by Blundell, Duncan and Meghir 
(1998) to examine the effect of tax reform on labor supply.
We estimate two sets of regressions: one regresses the level of benefits in each cell on 
unemployment risk, earnings, and immigrant status, and the other regresses the benefit replacement 
rate (benefits/earnings) on those same variables.  We estimate each of the regressions twice; first 
measuring unemployment risks and benefits (and replacement rates) for natives only and again 
including the immigrant populations. We show results for explanatory variables unemployment risk 




Column 3.  All regressions control for the level of earnings.  Panel A in Table 3 exhibits the results 
for the case with the dependent variable equal to benefit levels, and panel B shows results for benefit 
replacement rates.
Table 3. Regression results – benefits and benefit-replacement rates regressed on unemployment risk and 
immigrant share 
A. Dependent variable: unemployment benefits (2010 international USD) 
rbind Natives Only Also Immigrants 





























N 1266 1353 1267 1331 1407 1332 
K 61 60 61 61 60 61 
4e+04 4e+04 4e+04 4e+04 4e+04 4e+04 
Adj R2 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Countries 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Countries - years 52 52 52 52 52 52 
B.  Dependent variable: unemployment benefits replacement level (benefits/earnings) 
rbind Natives Only Also Immigrants 






































61 60 61 61 60 61 
1.1e+02 1.2e+02 1.1e+02 1.1e+02 1.3e+02 1.1e+02 
Adj R2
0.75 0.69 0.75 0.76 0.66 0.76 
Countries
13 13 13 13 13 13 
Countries - years 
52
52 52 52 52 52 
Source: Authors’ estimates using grouped datafrom the Luxembourg Income Study.  Regressions include cell as well as 
country-year fixed effects. 
The general impression from these regressions is consistent with our theoretical hypotheses, 
and the results from the U.S. data. As expected because of the reduction in population empathy, 
benefit levels decline significantly as the immigrant share of the population rises.  Moreover, across 
country variation in unemployment risk profiles shows dispersion of risk (as measured by the 
coefficient of variation of weeks unemployed) also has a large negative effect on benefits, and that 
effect is unchanged when we include immigrants' population share in the regression. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Basing our argument on theoretical models, we claim population heterogeneity should affect 
the generosity of a polity's social insurance programs through two distinct channels.  First, 
population heterogeneity likely reduces the well-known positive empathy effect thereby reducing 
welfare generosity because ethnic diversity undermines sentiments of solidarity among a citizenry. 
Second, ethnic heterogeneity likely increases dispersion of incomes thereby intensifying political 
conflict because heterogeneity of individual income risks renders it more difficult to achieve social 
consensus concerning tax-benefit programs. We utilized regression analysis on two data sets 
covering highly diverse polities, and found that distinct empathy and political conflict effects on 




Depending on the specific cross-jurisdiction relationship between ethnic and unemployment 
heterogeneity within a data sample, estimates of the empathy and political conflict effects require 
modeling both mechanisms.  To date, analyses of the negative relationship between ethnic 
heterogeneity and the size of the welfare state probably over- or underestimate the empathy effect.  
For example, perhaps surprisingly, within the U.S. the cross-state relationship between ethnic 
fractionalization and unemployment dispersion is negative (correlation -0.51).  Had our analysis 
omitted a measure of unemployment dispersion, the negative effect of ethnic fractionalization would 
have been underestimated! Future research should investigate these effects and relationships in more 




Appendix:Robustness Tests of U.S. Data and Description of LIS Data 
To examine the robustness of the regression results, we subjected the regression model to 
several tests.  First, we estimated the model using alternative data filters corresponding to different 
programmatic unemployment insurance policies.  Secondly, we subjected the model to robust 
heteroskedasticity estimation.   Third, we examined the 2sls model using a different, but weaker, 
instrumental variable for covered weeks of unemployment.  Finally, we examined how robust our 
results are to different specifications of the aggregate state variables policy mood, ethnic 
fractionalization, and dispersion of unemployment risk.
Table 4 exhibits the regression results (equation 1 only) from several alternative filters of the 
CPS data.  Model 3 in row 1 establishes an initial baseline indicative of the robustness of the 
hypothesized effects.  The reported results are from a regression that applies no filters to the CPS 
data.  The results appear quite similar to those of our original model in Table 2.  All estimated 
coefficients retain the correct signs and remain significant, and the estimated coefficients for log of 
the weekly wage and policy mood are virtually unchanged.  Differences in the estimated coefficients 
for the other variables are primarily due to lower correlations between these variables (especially log 
of covered weeks unemployed) with the dependent variable, a result indicated by a nearly two-thirds 
reduction in .
The differences between models 1 and 3 are largely due to two facts.  The completely 
unfiltered data behind model 3 contains many records with either large reported benefits and small 
(most often zero) reported weeks of unemployment or large durations of unemployment with small 
annual benefits.  These records undercut the relationship between benefits and covered weeks of 
unemployment.  Many are simply data outliers created by reporting and coding errors, and the fact 




reported unemployment) likely qualified for benefits during the latter part of 2005, did not receive 
payments until 2006, and found employment early in 2006.  These issues are not likely to affect 
correlations between benefits and weekly wages, fractionalization, or policy mood, but will certainly 
affect the correlation between benefits and weeks unemployed and the latter's dispersion.  As 
suggested, we addressed these issues by applying data filters based on allowed minimum and 
maximum WBA restrictions on the duration of benefits.
We subjected the model to several alternative specifications of the data filters simulating 
policy variables governing the measured relationships between benefits and the explanatory 
variables.  Each of these produced results similar to those of model one with estimated coefficients 
varying to some degree, but always statistically significant and with the hypothesized signs.  To 
illustrate with a particularly relevant alternative filter, Table 4's model 4 is the result of applying the 
actual state maximum and minimum WBAs to each record.
Table 4 













Coefficient 5.30 .218 .565 -.177 -.549 .009    
s.e. .262 .025 .027 .052 .219 .004    
t value 20.29** 8.61** 21.12** -3.42** -2.51** 2.61**    
Mean    2.36 .30 42.75    
          
Model 4 4.76** .188** .841** -.131** -.717** .009** N=1393 .530 315.35 
 .198 .020 .022 .037 .157 .003    
Mean    2.37 .299 42.68    
Model 5 5.06 .215 .682 -.129 -.443 .008    
 .375 .021 .122 .033 .143 .002 N=1421 .099 32.25 
Our final two tests involved correcting for possible heteroskedasticity in the error terms of 
our primary equation, and estimating the model via 2sls with an alternative instrument for covered 
weeks of unemployment.  Examining the scatter plot between the dependent variable and the 




estimation produced virtually identical standard errors and identical coefficients significant at one 
percent levels, and the results are not reported.  Our alternative instrument for covered weeks of 
unemployment was a respondent's "work status" during March of 2007 the year following the year 
under discussion.  Work status encompassed possibilities ranging from employed full-time or part-
time to unemployed or not in labor force.  Coding a categorical variable 1 if respondent was full-
time and 2 otherwise produced weak negative correlations between covered weeks of unemployment 
(-0.05) and logs of these variables (-0.15).   We argue work status during March of 2007 does not 
affect unemployment benefits received during 2006 (hence the error term of equation 1) after a 
recipient's covered unemployment and wage are controlled.   Model 5 of Table 3 shows the much 
weaker instrumental variable resulted in a reduced coefficient effect from covered weeks of 
unemployment, however the effect remained highly significant, and the effects of other explanatory 
variables changed little.
Table 5: Countries and Years Covered in LIS Data 
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